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Resumo 
O texto examina as implicações das mudanças da ordem mundial para a 
Europa. As alternativas para esse continente em crise são ou a defesa de 
sua posição e das instituições contemporâneas de desenvolvimento 
desigual ou a necessidade de adaptar-se a um papel mais modesto, a outro 
tipo de desenvolvimento, internamente orientado, socialmente inclusivo e 
dirigido aos recursos disponíveis internos à própria Europa. Este último 
modelo implicaria ruptura com o atual modelo exclusivista e externamente 
orientado, baseado no capital financeiro e nas exportações. Ele implicaria 
ainda inovações sociais, unidade na diversidade, de forma a garantir uma 
boa vida, promovendo laços de solidariedade. 
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Abstract 
The text examines the implications of a changing world for Europe. The 
alternatives for this continent in crisis are or the defence of its position and 
the current institutions of uneven development or the necessity to adapt itself 
to a more modest role, an another type of development, inward oriented, 
socially inclusive and geared toward using the resources available within 
Europe itself. This last model would imply a rupture from the the current 
outward oriented and exclusionary model based economically on finance 
capital and exports. This new model would imply in social innovations, unity 
in diversity to enable a good life by fostering bonds of solidarity.  
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1 All that is solid melts in the air 
 
A new world is emerging, one that will be different from the hierarchical 
centre-periphery relationship based on the hegemony of the West. This new 
world, however, emerges out of an order shaped by five centuries of 
imperialist and capitalist modernization and the respective paths followed by 
nations and regions over the last centuries. It will not emerge overnight, 
without backlash and without efforts by the still dominant USA to maintain as 
much control as possible. And it will not necessarily be a better world. The 
concrete outcome of these transformations will be shaped, as has always 
been the case in the past, by social and political struggles, by violence and 
force as well as competing efforts of antagonist interests to win the hearts 
and minds of the people for different socio-economic and cultural visions and 
models.  
The inspiration for the following reflection comes from my studies on 
Brazil (Fernandes; Novy, 2010; Novy, 1994, 2001a), a nation state 
composed of diverse cultures, but profoundly shaped by European 
dominance as well as by intellectuals who were deeply entrenched in the 
best of political and intellectual heritage Europe can offer (Fiori, 1995; 
Furtado, 2007; Oliveira, 1987; Tavares, 1969). Brazil, a country that ten 
years ago was enmeshed in neoliberal depression and suffering from 
widespread frustration about democracy (Fiori, 1995a; Sampaio Júnior, 
1999), is now experiencing dynamic transformations. Political and social 
changes taking place in Brazil resemble the golden age of European 
development after World War II: Raising wages as well as increasing social 
security nets together with the utilisation of national production capacities. 
Policies implemented by ex-President Lula and Dilma Rousseff, his 
successor, show that a socially inclusive form of democracy is not only 
possible, but leads to positive results and broad popular support (Barbosa, 
2010), similar to what happened in Europe during the 20th century. 
Unfortunately, this rich social and cultural heritage is currently dismantled in 
Europe. This article is a reflection on my own perplexity about the lack of 
enthusiasm in Europe about the ongoing transformations in Brazil — 30 
million people less who are poor, 15 million new formal jobs created in eight 
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years — as well as the astonishing lack of respect for one’s own past 
struggles and institutions in Europe — the tremendous achievements of the 
workers movements and citizen initiatives, as well as our passivity facing the 
destruction of social cohesion and solidarity at home.  
I will focus on the implications of a changing world order for Europe, a 
continent in crisis, being aware that what is good for Europe is not 
necessarily good for the world. To give due importance to the specific 
context of Europe as one of many different world regions is the opposite of 
Eurocentrism, as the latter uncritically assumes Europe to be the — ethically 
superior — norm and reference for analyzing and evaluating development in 
other parts of the world. Europe is still one of the richest regions of the world. 
Although it has adapted to the role as junior partner of the US, it has not — 
as we are currently witnessing in Libya — overcome its colonial inclination to 
help, police and control the rest of the world. Adapting to a more modest role 
will pose crucial challenges and require broad conscientisation. Will Europe 
try to defend its position and the current institutions of uneven development, 
be it via NATO, World Bank or the IMF? Or will it perceive the necessity and 
potential to shape another type of development, one which is more modest, 
inward oriented, socially inclusive and geared towards using the resources 
available within Europe itself? This would imply a rupture from the current 
outward oriented and exclusionary model, based economically on finance 
capital and exports and politically on arms and the mission to spread the 
European model of democracy, markets and human rights.  
 
2 Europe: Capitalism’s latest victim 
 
Past transformations have always taken place without changing the 
profoundly uneven character of capitalist development. Current challenges 
of Western supremacy and a potential shift in geoeconomic power must not 
be confounded by a terminal crisis of capitalism. What is emerging in parts of 
the Global South are varieties of capitalist development, more or less liberal, 
inclusive, democratic and competitive. Different from the political liberation of 
the colonized territories and the block-free movment of the 1950s and 
1960s, current geopolitical changes are backed by increasing economic 
power. Industry is moving to the Global South and with it power, technology, 
capital and control (Arrighi, 2008).  
While the European vision of the good life for all in a capitalist 
consumer society, the social democratic aspiration of a car for everybody or 
at least every household, inspires the creation of welfare capitalism in 
emerging countries, Europe and North America are confronted with a 
different political and economic situation. The North Atlantic West is, for the 
first time in its 500 year old world dominance, faced with a situation in which 
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the rules of the capitalist world economy are, slowly but steadily, turning 
themselves against their creators (Arrighi, 2005, 2005a). While there were 
shifts of hegemony over the last 500 years, they remained within the West 
itself: From Genova to Holland, Britain and in the 20th century to the US. 
Finally, world gravity might change in this century beyond the “West”.  
This conjuncture is profoundly different in the West and the “rest” — to 
use a distinction from Stuart Hall: Europe and the USA, the dominant Centre, 
are suffering from financialisation, the spread of a speculative mood, and the 
difficulty to find productive investments for excessive capital. This turns them 
into “rich, but indebted countries”. In many of the emerging countries of the 
Global South, growth rates and accumulation of productive forces remain 
high. Without denying the dangers of climate change and the constraints 
imposed by ecological destruction which results from spreading the 
American way of life to the world, there is a potentially emancipatory future 
for the Global South moving towards welfare capitalism, imitating and 
innovating the consumerist way of life of Europe and North America 
(Dunford; Yeung, 2010; Fernandes; Novy, 2010). This model of capitalist 
development creates a world middle class and spreads a way of life which 
until recently was limited to Europe, North America and a few other islands in 
the world economy. The result is a massive reduction of poverty in countries 
like Brazil and China, while inequality and insecurity increase within most of 
the nations — Latin American countries are an exception — and huge 
segments of the Global South remain stuck in poverty and hunger. But the 
latter has never been an impediment to capitalist modernization. 
But this is no option for Europe, a continent composed of “rich, but 
indebted countries”. Therefore, spatially differentiated strategies of 
progressive political movements are required. I may be wrong, but 
progressive forces in the Global South might be able to limit themselves to 
regulate capitalist development, so that social inclusion and ecological 
sustainability are achieved. Anyhow, it will not be up to Europeans to decide 
on this. Europe, however, has to be more radical. It has to go back to its 
roots, to identify feasible strategies for its civilization model in the 21st 
century. It faces the challenge to manage decline intelligently (Arrighi, 2009, 
p. 83). Will Europe, creator of capitalist modernization as the driver of a 
specific form of progress, be able to elaborate a less aggressive and 
destructive civilisational model at home, a form of civilization which is less 
obsessive in controlling other parts of the world and focuses more on 
conviviality, social cohesion and sustainability internally? This would be a 
paradigmatic shift in Western habitus which seems remote given the current 
Zeitgeist, ideologies, political forces and institutions. But it is not illusionary, 
as Europe is increasingly suffering from capitalist competition. This is the 
reason why anti-capitalist sentiments are widespread in populist and 
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extreme right political forces. Systemic changes which make Europe less 
vulnerable would be in its very self-interest. 
 
3 A Good Life 
 
The starting point for my Euro-focussed search for an eco-social 
civilization model is philosophy and the antique Greek. The idea of a good 
life is an old preoccupation which already inspired philosophical deliberation 
in the antique Greek Polis, a public place for free citizens (Colson; Fickett, 
2005). The good life, that was the common denominator, is a life that permits 
human flourishing and happiness. While concrete suggestions varied, there 
was a certain pragmatic understanding that the good life is related to the 
care for oneself, a happy, but moderate conduct of life (Foucault, 1989, 
1989a), but one that is aware of the value of public deliberation and the 
common good (Arendt, 1998). The human flourishing of male property 
owners went, however, hand in hand with the exploitation of slaves and the 
subordinate position of women and foreigners: It remained a good life for the 
few. To this day, to construct civilizations that offer a high quality of life for 
segments of the population has remained the key characteristic of elitist 
socioeconomic systems.  
It was up to the French Revolution to question class and political 
privileges: Liberty, Equality and Fraternity became the slogan of an historical 
inflection of demo-cracy, the government by the people. The idea was so 
revolutionary that it was not digested immediately, but led to ongoing 
discrimination by class, gender and ethnicity (Canfora, 2006; Klinger; Knapp; 
Sauer, 2007; Klinger, 2010). Olympe de Gouges was decapitated by the 
guillotine, the struggle for slave liberation in Haiti combated by European 
powers with all means. However, the vision of Enlightenment, the joint 
flourishing of equality and freedom, started to challenge the idea that a few 
have the privilege to conduct a good life while the rest is born to serve. It 
was a concern that is best summarized in the creed that “[…] the flourishing 
of everybody is the condition of the full human flourishing of all”, a dictum 
that resonates more a biblical psalm than a slogan from the Communist 
Manifesto. But it was written by Marx and Engels (Marx; Engels, 1986). 
The 19th century took up the idea of liberty, more precisely the freedom 
of the propertied classes, the successful citizens, who were able to 
accumulate and to consume. They obtained civil rights which protected them 
from state arbitrariness. As they had money, they were able to consume 
what was manufactured. “Social wealth appears as a formidable collection of 
goods”, with this words Karl Marx opened his opus magnum (Marx, 1986). 
But it remained a divided class society and a consumer society for the few. 
And it went hand in hand with colonialism and imperialism, exploitation and 
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discrimination (Hobsbawm, 2003). For decades, popular struggles for civic 
and social rights, strikes and the organization in mass parties challenged the 
existing order. Although defeated temporarily, the correlation of forces 
changed positively after the world depression in the 1930s and World War II.  
The 20th century was a period of huge innovations in the macro 
institutions of modern societies. Red Vienna, like many other innovative 
forms of municipal socialism at the beginning of the 20yh century, fostered a 
political culture against class privileges and authoritarianism (Novy; 
Hammer; Leubolt, 2009). The New Deal and other innovative responses to 
the World Economic Crisis of the 1930s legitimized a socially inclusive form 
of democracy. After the war, the constitution of social citizenship, conceding 
social rights to all citizens, turned out to be the most effective policy to 
strengthen liberal democracy and the rule of law. Civic, political and social 
rights went hand in hand (Marshall, 1950). The result was a dramatic shift of 
huge parts of the population from marginalized workers to consumers and 
citizens during the 20th century. The welfare state was the pillar on which 
the middle class society of the 20th century was erected in the Global North: 
Cars for everybody is the emblematic expression of this credo. It was a 
unique realization of the good life for all who were part of a certain territory 
and people, famously expressed by the Swedes as “people’s home”, 
understood as full employment and generalized social security (Esping-        
-Andersen, 1990). For a few decades it became the leitmotif of an anti-         
-Fascist consensus: To avoid social unrest undermining the pillars of liberal 
democracy, society has to offer a good life for all. A socially inclusive form of 
democracy was perceived as the key ingredient of social peace, cohesion 
and individual flourishing (Bowles; Gintis, 1986; Canfora, 2006a). Even 
limited to a national power container and the respective repressive handling 
of outsiders, foreigners and migrants, it was a huge progress in relation to 
exclusionary liberal capitalism. Nevertheless, it remained within the 
constraints of capitalist consumerism, a labour regime based on exploitation 
and its focus on commodities for the satisfaction of human needs.  
Egalitarian achievements were undermined by neoliberalism as a 
deliberate class project in favour of the concentration of power in the hands 
of a few, apparently the fittest (Harvey, 2005a). Inequality is a main trait of 
current supply-side policies to enhance competitiveness. Neoliberalism 
undermines the national power container, shifting power towards 
corporations and the finance sector within nations and on the world market. 
The hollowing out of the welfare state results in raising inequality (Perrons; 
Plomien, 2010; Wilkinson; Pickett, 2010) and increasing insecurity of the 
middle classes (Herrmann, 2010). The fringes of the continent — from 
Ireland to Portugal, from Greece to the Baltic countries — are already 
abandoning the prospect of welfare capitalism, increasing class cleavages 
and social disintegration. Currently, it is pure decline without emancipatory 
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perspectives. Social inequality increases and the fruits of welfare are 
harvested by less and less (Becker, 2010; Hadjimichalis; Hudson, 2007).  
Europe is a continent composed of small nation states. Territorial 
fragmentation dates back to the Westphalian treaty in 1648. It was increased 
by the disintegration of the Habsburg Empire which resulted in 
Kleinstaaterei, the building of many small nation states (Hobsbawm, 1990). 
During the 20th century, more and more of these small states became the 
territorial units of institutionalized political democracy and social security. In 
1957, European integration started with the Treaty of Rome. It deepened 
economic integration and led to a specific transnational mode of 
governance. Until recently, Europe was proud of this unique governance 
model which — so the argument — has substituted hierarchical and 
bureaucratically organized governments. It was a specific form of politics of 
scale, of mobilizing spatial arrangements and scale to shift the correlation of 
power. Creating a supra-national entity without a clear model for democracy, 
social security and sustainability, has been instrumental to implement 
neoliberal economic policies and has isolated economic decision making 
from democratic accountability (Anderson, 2009; Canfora, 2006; Leubolt; 
Novy; Beinstein, 2007). Thereby, it has put Europe on a neoliberal path 
which decision maker did not even abandon after 2008. The costs of 
liberalization and privatization have been borne by the public, resulting in 
soaring public debts and austerity measures (Klatzer; Schlager, 2011).  
There is more than one reason to be pessimistic about Europe’s future 
in a capitalist world economy. A realistic evaluation has to be pessimistic, 
assuming a spiral movement of decline with unpredictable results: The 
current efforts to substitute an already problematic compromise between 
social cohesion and competitiveness, as defined in the Lisbon agenda, with 
a “competitiveness pact” shows the radicalisation of neoliberal obsession in 
Europe (Apeldoorn; Drahokoupil; Horn, 2009). The outcome of this ongoing 
efforts to achieve balanced budgets and increase competiveness is the 
opposite of the expected: Europe’s economic supremacy in the world is 
eroding quickly (Küblböck; Jäger; Novy, 2010). Today, public debt is higher 
than at the beginning of the 1990s, when the Maastricht criteria were 
introduced as guidelines for European policy making. And they have 
exploded from 2007 onwards due to the rescue packages for the financial 
sector (Klatzer; Schlager, 2011). In Europe, secular spatial hierarchies of 
centre and  periphery, the East — West, North — South cleavages, have 
dramatically increased over the last years, as the burden of unequal 
development and unbalanced trade and current accounts is mainly carried 
by the periphery (Hadjimichalis, 2011). The competitiveness pact punishes 
countries with a negative trade balance and increasing real wages, without 
problematising wage constraining policies and the growth model of the 
export economies, especially Germany (Becker, 2010; Unger, 2010). This 
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makes organized politics, social planning and coherent efforts to build 
solidarity and to implement ecological innovations more difficult. The only 
rudimentary democratic, but highly fragmented form of European 
governance and the absence of a viable substitute for the lack of a 
European government increases the problem (Leubolt; Novy; Beinstein, 
2007). While the European elites, isolated from democratic accountability at 
the EU-level, stick to economic liberalism, there is an increasing sentiment of 
decay. Nostalgia of post-war welfare capitalism, of a past that shines brighter 
than the future, is spreading (Judt, 2010; Sennett, 2003).  
 
4 Territories and social innovation 
 
The current multiple crises which have affected Europe deeply have 
inspired the search for alternatives. Over the last years, the movement for 
another globalization has introduced a utopian and cosmopolite perspective 
opposing neoliberal TINA — There is no alternative (Harvey, 2000). Since 
1999, a broad social movement has re-affirmed that another world is 
possible! This movement has always criticized nationalistic policies and 
exclusionary policies based on insider-outsider arrangements. Thereby, it 
has aimed at a new form of planetary responsibility and proposed rethinking 
the spatial imaginary due to globalization. But globalization has always been 
a rhetoric in favour of liberal reforms, more a discursive affirmation than a 
reality of world-wide geoeconomic dynamics (Novy, 2001). Correctly, 
scholars have drawn attention to the importance of a relational concept of 
space, be it networks, linkages or commodity chains with nodes as 
organizers. But, as often in the obsession with en vogue “turns”, be it 
linguistic or spatial, there is the danger of dualistically affirming the opposite 
as correct: Networks, so the story goes, instead of territories should offer the 
spatial imaginary to describe economic development; economic power, so 
the apologets of so-called globalization, instead of political power explains 
world development (Castells, 1998). Thereby, the baby has been thrown with 
the bath water, or to use the academic language, dialectics has been 
substituted by dualism. But spatial analysis has to be dialectical, as the key 
characteristic of space is the dialectics of the fixed and the fluid, as David 
Harvey has remembered us time and again (Harvey, 1985, 1989, 2005). 
This dialectics of being and emerging, of change and stability, as expressed 
in the dialectics of space and place, of linkages and territories must not be 
reduced to a simplistic flow — and network — based conception of current 
spatial development (Hadjimichalis; Hudson, 2006; Sassen, 2006; 
Swyngedouw, 2004). There is always the search for a spatial fix which 
stabilizes economic and political dynamics, accomodating class struggle and 
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social and political conflicts in general as well as institutionalizing a new 
territorialized order.  
Dominant interpretations of globalization have stressed the novelty of 
the current conjuncture of increasing global interdependencies, but have not 
sufficiently taken into consideration the long struggle of progressive 
movements especially in Europe and North America, culminating in the 20th 
century. Most of the social innovations which are discussed in academia and 
implemented in thousands of initiatives have a territorial base, a 
phenomenon reinforced if ecological concerns are taken seriously (Moulaert; 
Nussbaumer, 2005, 2009). Social innovations, like participatory democracy 
in the neighbourhood as well as participatory budgeting and planning for 
regional development are steps to empower citizens locally. Solidarity 
economy and flourishing regionalized markets as well as innovative forms of 
public service delivery are further means of organizing socioeconomic 
development with and for the people (Drewe; Klein; Hulsbergen, 2008; 
Leubolt; Novy; Becker, 2008; Martinelli, 2010). All this has to be organized in 
specific territories, from neighbourhoods to regions, and it has to be 
embedded in supra-local regulations be it nationally or — as in the case of 
Europe — on a continental scale. And territorial arrangement always lead to 
insider-outsider distinctions, even if social closure is defined in a more 
permeable and fluid way.  
While theories on financial markets, global commodity chains and 
global cities focus on networks and linkages between sites, nodes and 
places, concern with the struggle for access to resources, and geopolitics, 
especially war and revolution, requires a more balanced perspective with 
respect to territories. The lessons from capitalist modernization over the last 
centuries, as described by Braudel and Arrighi, indicates that a territory, a 
power container, is a constraint as well as a prerequisite for capitalist 
development. Territories are important spaces in geoeconomics and 
geopolitics. Currently, however, the focus has shifted from the small to the 
big nations. This is a problem for Europe composed of small nation states. 
As theories of national economic development in the 19th century like List 
were well aware, size is a crucial element for successful national 
development in capitalism. With respect to inhabitants, the EU as a whole 
still hosts more people (502 mi) than Brazil (190 mi), but well below China 
(1.333 mi). The territory of the 27 member states of the EU, however, covers 
only 4.324.782km², while Brazil as one nation state covers 8.514.877km², a 
little behind China with 9.571.302km². With adequate policies, as they are 
currently implemented, the emerging national economies are rapidly 
becoming bigger markets than the old European power. While China will 
overtake the US before 2025, Brazil is currently overtaking all European 
national economies with the exception of Germany.  
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The world is becoming multipolar, based on territories which create 
their context-specific forms of accommodating freedom, equality and 
solidarity. Common deliberation and decision making within the UN-system 
plays a key role in securing minimum standards of human rights, democracy 
and social development worldwide without simplistic and premature 
interventionism. But context and democracy matters. Therefore, every 
territory has to choose its specific socioeconomic model. Specificity has to 
be valorized. This is in tune with postmodernism which criticized 
modernization as uniformising, neglecting nature and destroying difference 
(Harvey, 1989). This criticism was radicalized by postcolonial and post-          
-development views, which centered criticism on the West as dominant, 
oppressive, expansionist and imperial. While correct in many aspects of past 
and current practice and thinking of the West, it does not sufficiently grasp 
the internal dynamics of Western modernization and their liberating      
effects — from slave to women liberation — nor the creative and courageous 
struggles in Europe itself of those from below.  
Political strategies to achieve a good life for all have to be context-         
-sensitive and require a dialectical understanding of space and history. 
There does not exist a single globally valid solution. Territories have to be 
sovereign, democratic power containers with a set of rules valid within, while 
permitting the maximum of permeability to avoid discrimination and to 
respect universal human rights. Therefore, Europe is not the centre, but one 
territory in the world — which requires specific strategies to promote the 
good life for all in this continent. To dwells on the elaboration of an eco-         
-social civilization model for Europe will be the focus of the final section of 
this article.  
 
5 Towards a return home 
 
Europe is in a deep crisis, a crisis with multiple dimensions but 
determined by the crisis of neoliberal capitalism and the elitist European 
governance. This is dramatic, but offers perspectives for systemic 
transformations. Looking back, it were often the disasters which led to 
progressive changes, be it social legislation after World War I or the 
consensus on social citizenship after the world depression and Fascism. In 
multiple struggles during the 20th century, Europeans, the masses as well as 
the middle class, were struggling for basic needs, dignity, democracy, social 
rights and a good job. For decades, Europe obtained a development model 
of welfare capitalism which aims at offering a good life for all inhabitants 
within a national power container. With all its limitations and taking into 
consideration the high costs at home — war, fascism, genocide and 
dictatorships — not to talk about colonialism and imperialism, the national 
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welfare regimes remain crucial points of reference for future strategies. It 
was the most advanced civilizational model with respect to equality and 
equal freedom for all, even within the straightjacket of consumerism and 
class cleavages. Culturally, it created a middle class society, a society 
dominated by universal modes of living and working. In Europe, the 
challenge for the 21st century consists in safeguarding these achievements, 
while overcoming the capitalist accumulation imperative, the cultural 
limitations of consumer society and the lack of awareness of the socio-         
-ecological embeddedness of socioeconomic development.  
Without denying the enormous costs of modernisation and the destiny 
of a much too long list of victims, there is a long and slow historical 
movement of European societies to offer a good life to an ever increasing 
part of the population. This inspires creativity, increases audacity and gives 
hope for future struggles. Emancipatory strategies require a path-sensitive 
approach, one that values past struggles and achievements. I will give a 
recent example. The shift from individual to collective bargaining resulted in 
a specific Fordist arrangement of the wage relation (Aglietta, 1987). Trade 
union leaders negotiated wages for a whole occupation group as a 
collective. Collective bargaining, the homogenous political negotiation of 
wages and salaries within a clearly delimited territory, is an important 
ingredient of human dignity and workers standard of living in the West. It was 
a top-down form of corporatism which led to the bureaucratization of trade 
unions, to corruption and a lack of internal democracy. All this was with good 
reason criticized by left activists and intellectuals. Unfortunately, the 
progressive content of a political negotiation of wages valid for a whole 
territory was not sufficiently appreciated until the frontal attack on collective 
bargaining and union power in Wisconsin, US, in 2011. This has to change, 
if future struggles should be successful. 
In Europe, consumerism has gone hand in hand with increasing 
individualism, a focus on leisure and disinterest in common affairs. But 
conformism and resignation have never remained the normal path of 
European development for long. There is hope, and it lies in the West’s rich 
legacy to struggle for a good life for all. None of the achievements of welfare 
capitalism, be it social rights or democratic participation, was granted due to 
the good will of policy makers, but were fought for in political struggles, 
obtained with sacrifice and blood, with revolutions and wars. And many of 
the revolutions were fought for with the desire to return to a past which got 
lost due to exclusionary, authoritarian or oppressive modernisation. In the 
past, the price paid for social progress was often very high. All too often, 
economic scarcity, crisis and war were the masters for historical lessons. It 
might be Europe’s fate again. But this is no necessity and it should be 
avoided — with nearly all means. 
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But decline does not necessarily result in decay. Another future for 
Europe is possible, one based on the best European history has to offer: To 
permit unity in diversity, to enable individual flourishing by fostering bonds of 
solidarity. An emancipatory step forward in Europe will be made by 
struggling for a European social citizenship as a prerequisite for social 
cohesion in European cities and regions (Novy, 2010). This does not mean a 
uniform Europe — wide system of entitlements, but place — and inhabitant- 
-based arrangements which enable everybody to conduct a good life: access 
to public transportation and health, good schools as well as an affordable 
old-age insurance. Obviously, this requires social innovations to organize 
mobility for all, care-taking for all as well as good and useful work for all. 
Democratically decided Europe-wide regulations will have to be based on 
the principles of a mixed and regionalized economy and markets will be 
freed from the monopoly power of big corporations. And all this embedded in 
a global governance structure based on common values and mutual respect.  
This sounds utopian and it is indeed an audacious vision. But it is a 
vision deeply rooted in the European memory of the 20th century, in the 
desire for a secure and stable life in harmony with one’s own village and 
neighbourhood. It is a revolutionary and progressive and a conservative and 
romantic vision at the same time. There were huge steps forward undertaken 
since 1789 in Europe. A European commonwealth that offers a good life for 
all is not an inaccessible future, but a concrete utopia in tune with Ernst 
Bloch, a key European thinker of the 20th century, who ended his opus 
magnum on the “Principle of Hope” with a plea for a radical temporal-spatial 
return “[...] in creating something in the world, that shines back to childhood 
and were nobody has yet been: Home” (so entsteht in der Welt etwas, das 
allen in die Kindheit scheint und worin noch niemand war: Heimat) (Bloch, 
1959, p. 1628).  
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